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Medicare and GAAP: Understanding the
Decision of the Sixth Circuit in Guernsey
Memorial Hospital v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services
Robert L. Roth*
On April 4, 1994, the Supreme Court granted the govern-
ment's writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the ma-
jor Medicare capital cost case of 1993, Guernsey Memorial Hos-
pital v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.' This important
case illustrates the tension that exists between Medicare and
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") when de-
termining Medicare reimbursement for capital costs.2 This arti-
cle will use the Guernsey case as a vehicle for analyzing the
interplay between Medicare and GAAP and will discuss other
relevant recent judicial decisions.
I. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN GAAP AND MEDICARE
The Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act ("the
Act") 3 entitle qualified providers to reimbursement for the rea-
sonable cost of furnishing hospital services to Medicare benefi-
* Robert L. Roth serves as Counsel at Dechert Price & Rhoads in its Washing-
ton, D.C. office. He received his Bachelor of Arts from Lehigh University in 1976,
and his Juris Doctor from Syracuse University College of Law in 1982. Mr. Roth
formerly served in the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Health
and Human Services and was involved with the Guernsey case. This article is in-
tended to analyze the legal issues presented in the Guernsey case. The views ex-
pressed in this article are exclusively Mr. Roth's. This article is not intended to
present any view or position of the United States or any party.
1. 996 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1395 (1994).
2. For cost-reporting periods beginning on or after October 1, 1983, Congress en-
acted a new system for reimbursing inpatient hospital operating costs under Medicare
known as the "prospective payment system" or "PPS." See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991 ); 42 C.F.R. § 412 (1992). The application of PPS to inpatient
hospital capital-related costs is being phased in for cost-reporting periods beginning
on or after October 1, 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(g) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Guern-
sey concerns capital-related costs claimed in the hospital's cost report for fiscal year
1985.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1395bbb (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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ciaries. 4 "Reasonable cost" is defined in the statute as "the cost
actually incurred, excluding therefrom any part of incurred cost
found to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed
health services."5 Accordingly, Medicare will only reimburse
providers for costs that were "actually incurred" and not the re-
sult of an inefficient service delivery system.
The statute further states that Medicare reimbursement for
hospital costs "shall be determined in accordance with regula-
tions [adopted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services]
establishing the method or methods to be used, and the items to
be included .... 6 When adopting these regulations, the Act
requires the Secretary to "consider, among other things, the
principles generally applied by national organizations or estab-
lished prepayment organizations (which have developed such
principles) .... -7 Some have argued that Congress intended
this reference to "principles generally applied by national orga-
nizations" to force the Secretary to consider GAAP when for-
mulating the regulations. However, the Secretary did not
interpret the statute in this way, and, when first adopting the
reasonable cost regulations in 1966, stated:
In the framing of these proposed regulations for the determi-
nation of reasonable cost, it was the intent to give considera-
tion to the principles generally applied by national
organizations and established prepayment programs. Accord-
ingly, in the development of the proposed principles of reim-
bursement there has been extensive consultation with
representatives of the American Hospital Association and
with many others including representatives of the American
Nursing Home Association, the American Association of Hos-
pital Accountants, the National Blue Cross Association, indi-
vidual Blue Cross plans, the Health Insurance Association of
America, and the private insurance field as well as State and
Federal agencies which purchase hospital and institutional
services.8
At the time that the reasonable cost regulations were being
formulated, providers were concerned that they would be re-
quired to prepare one set of books for their general business and
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 31 Fed. Reg. 7,864 (1966).
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another for Medicare. To dispel this concern, the Secretary
adopted two regulations,9 which read in pertinent part:
The principles of cost reimbursement require that providers
maintain sufficient financial records and statistical data for
proper determination of costs payable under the program.
Standardized definitions, accounting, statistics, and reporting
practices that are widely accepted in the hospital and related
fields are followed. Changes in these practices and systems will
not be required in order to determine costs payable under the
principles of [Medicare] reimbursement.
The cost data must be based on an approved method of cost
finding and on the accrual basis of accounting.
Under the accrual basis of accounting, revenue is reported in
the period when it is earned, regardless of when it is collected,
and expenses are reported in the period in which they are in-
curred, regardless of when they are paid.'"
Based on these rules, as a general matter hospitals must use ac-
crual accounting to determine when a cost is "actually incurred"
for Medicare purposes. Some accrual accounting principles are
contained in a collection known as "generally accepted account-
ing principles," or "GAAP." 1 However, GAAP is not intended
to address whether a cost is necessary "in the efficient delivery
of needed health services.' 2
II. THE TENSIONS BETWEEN GAAP AND MEDICARE
Since the beginning of the Medicare program, providers have
submitted cost reports as required by the foregoing regulations
and have sought reimbursement for costs reported in accord-
ance with GAAP. The Secretary generally paid these costs, ex-
cept in two notable situations: first, when the Secretary
9. These regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(a) (1992) and § 413.24(a) & (b)(2) (1992),
were originally codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405.406(a) (1967) and § 405.453(a) & (b)(2)
(1967), respectively. They were moved to 42 C.F.R. Part 413 as part of a regulatory
reorganization. 51 Fed. Reg. 34,790 (1986).
10. 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20(a) & 413.24(a) & (b)(2) (1992) (emphasis added).
11. GAAP are found in the three official publications of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"): 1) Accounting Principles Board opinions,
2) Financial Accounting Standards Board statements, and 3) Accounting Research
Bulletins. Guernsey Memorial Hosp. v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 996
F.2d 830, 832 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993). See WALTER B. MEIGS & ROBERT F. MEIGs, Ac-
COUNTING: THE BASIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS 511-22 (7th ed. 1987) (explaining
why GAAP is considered authoritative in the preparation of financial statements).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988).
19941
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determined that reimbursement of a cost would violate the stat-
ute because the cost, although accrued under GAAP, had not
been "actually incurred" by the hospital in that the hospital had
not incurred a cash outlay in the year for which payment is
sought;13 and second, when the Secretary determined that reim-
bursement of a cost would be inconsistent with the statute be-
cause the cost, although incurred, was not a "reasonable cost"-
in other words, not "necessary in the efficient delivery of
needed health services. "14
When faced with these situations, providers have taken the
position that the Secretary is required by 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20
and 413.24 to reimburse costs properly reported in accordance
with accrual accounting principles (GAAP). It is the providers'
view that the Secretary cannot refuse to reimburse these costs
unless the Secretary has adopted a regulation providing for
other treatment of the costs. 15 According to the Secretary, prov-
iders can look to GAAP to determine whether a cost is reim-
bursable under Medicare only if there is no Medicare program
pronouncement on point. 6 Disputes in this area, such as those
in Guernsey, often arise when the Secretary's departure from
13. An example of this is sick-leave costs, which can be accrued for GAAP pur-
poses in a particular cost year even if the leave is "carried over" by employees to the
next year. Thus, the provider does not actually incur the cost until the sick leave is
used or the employee receives payment for the leave in a different cost year. See
HCFA, MEDICARE PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL § 2144.8 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter PRM] (discussing reimbursement methodology for sick-leave costs).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988). For example, the cost of a case of
champagne may be properly recorded for GAAP purposes, but proper recording of
this cost will not, by itself, make it payable as a "reasonable cost" related to patient
care.
15. See Guernsey Memorial Hosp. v. Sullivan, 796 F. Supp. 283, 288 (S.D. Ohio
1992). The word "regulation," as it is used here, refers to a policy pronouncement
adopted under the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). Although the APA explicitly exempts ben-
efit programs, like Medicare, from the APA notice and comment requirements (see
Holy Cross Hosp.-Mission Hills v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1340, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984)), the
Secretary waived the exception to the APA in 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 2,532 (1971). See
National Medical Enters., Inc. v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 664, 670 n.8 (9th Cir. 1992).
16. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,292 (Oct. 20, 1976); PRM at I. See HCA Health Servs. of
Midwest, Inc. v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding Secretary's reliance
on GAAP where no Medicare policy on point); see also Dominguez Valley Hosp. v.
Shalala, Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 41.961 (D.C.C.D. Cal. 1993). A pro-
gram announcement includes a regulation or a manual provision. Regulations are
subject to the notice and comment requirements of the APA. Manual provisions are
instructions to Medicare participants that are published by the Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA"). The Provider Reimbursement Manual contains most of
the manual provisions at issue in GAAP cases.
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GAAP is embodied only in a manual provision and not in a
regulation.
III. COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO MEDICARE
AND GAAP
As stated above, Medicare will only reimburse those costs
that the Secretary finds were related to patient care and actually
incurred in the year for which reimbursement is sought.17
Courts have generally agreed with the Secretary's position that
the standards for determining whether a cost reported in accord-
ance with GAAP meets the statutory requirement of being
"necessary in the efficient delivery of needed health services"18
should be upheld regardless of whether the standard is con-
tained in a regulation or manual provision. 9 The Secretary has
enjoyed success in these cases in part because the determination
of whether a cost is related to patient care requires an interpre-
tation of the statutory term "reasonable costs"; 20 under Chevron
17. For a discussion of the application of this two-part test, see Charlotte Memo-
rial Hosp. & Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988).
19. For examples of cases where the court upheld a regulation denying reimburse-
ment for a cost reported in accordance with GAAP because the cost was not a "rea-
sonable cost" under 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A), see National Medical Enters., Inc. v.
Sullivan, 957 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1992) (regulation establishing that goodwill was not
related to patient care was reasonable, and conflict with GAAP was not an adequate
basis for invalidating the regulation); Vallejo General Hosp. v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 229
(9th Cir. 1988) (GAAP did not apply to depreciation because there was a regulation
on point); Providence Hosp. v. Shalala, 843 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (when
the Secretary refused to allow the use of a blended rate for all hospitals involved with
a multi-hospital combined borrowing, requiring each hospital to determine its applica-
ble interest rate in accordance with the regulations, court rejected the hospitals' reli-
ance on GAAP, finding that the dispute involved a substantive Medicare issue rather
than a pure accounting issue; therefore, providers could not rely on GAAP to estab-
lish the reasonableness of their costs).
For examples of cases where the court upheld a manual provision denying reim-
bursement for a cost reported in accordance with GAAP because the cost was not a
"reasonable cost" under 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A), see National Medical Enters.,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1990) (stock maintenance costs are not related
to patient care; GAAP applies to record keeping); Sun Towers, Inc. v. Heckler, 725
F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984) (court rejected GAAP rec-
ognition of stock maintenance costs, deferring to the Secretary's manual provision
that stated that these costs are not related to patient care); American Medical Int'l,
Inc. v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 677 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (because a
manual provision applied to stock maintenance costs, GAAP did not apply); contra
Villa View Community Hosp., Inc. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1983) (Ninth
Circuit relied on GAAP to justify Medicare payment holding that the Secretary's reli-
ance on a regulation to deny payment for land use costs on the grounds that the costs
were not related to patient care lacked a reasonable basis).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988).
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U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,21 courts must
defer to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation of those stat-
utes within the Secretary's authority.22 Accordingly, courts will
generally uphold a reasonable policy, regardless of whether that
policy is embodied in a regulation or an interpretive rule.23
Conversely, an unreasonable interpretation will not be re-
deemed by its form.24
Once the Secretary determines that a cost is related to patient
care and is otherwise reimbursable under Medicare, the Secre-
tary must next determine whether the cost was "actually in-
curred" in the cost year presented by the hospital or whether
reimbursement would be more appropriate in some other cost
year. In general, the Secretary has determined that costs ac-
crued under GAAP were "actually incurred." However, the
Secretary occasionally has found that GAAP principles do not
accurately reflect when a cost was incurred, and in those cases,
the Secretary required other treatment of the costs. 26
The Secretary has generally been successful in defending poli-
cies that defer reimbursement to providers because the cost was
not actually incurred by the provider in the cost year for which
payment is sought, regardless of whether the policy took the
form of a regulation or simply a manual provision.27 However,
several courts have held that the Secretary must apply GAAP to
determine when allowable costs have been incurred because,
they held, deviations from GAAP that have been published only
in manual form are not enforceable.28 It was a challenge to a
21. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
22. National Medical Enters., Inc. v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d at 669.
23. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
24. See Villa View Community Hosp. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1983).
25. Providers seeking to apply GAAP must be prepared to show that GAAP ac-
curately reflects the cost and that the cost at issue was related to patient care in the
year it was accrued, as opposed to the cost of merely running a business. Villa View,
720 F.2d at n.18.
26. See, e.g., Palms of Pasadena Hosp. v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
27. Id. (regulation-court upheld a regulation that required providers to treat bad
debts as if incurred on a cash basis); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.2d
823 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (manual provision-court upheld the denial of reimbursement of
accrued pension costs because they were not funded in the year at issue); Queen's
Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 797 F. Supp. 821 (D. Haw. 1991) (manual provision-medi-
cal malpractice costs were not incurred until self-insurance trust fund was
established).
28. Charlotte Memorial Hosp. & Medical Ctr. v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 595, 599 (4th
Cir. 1988) (timing of deferred compensation-court decided that GAAP overrode
manual provision because GAAP accurately reflected when the cost was incurred);
National Medical Enters., Inc. v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1988) (court refused
[Vol. 3
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manual provision that was presented to the Sixth Circuit in
Guernsey.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GUERNSEY DECISION
The Guernsey case provides a review of the Secretary's policy
of reimbursing costs relating to the advance refunding of debt
by a hospital.29 The Secretary adopted manual provisions indi-
cating the circumstances under which costs related to an ad-
vance-refunding transaction are "allowable" under Medicare.3 °
The Secretary's policy is "to implicitly recognize any gain or loss
incurred as the result of an advance refunding over the period
from the date the refunding debt is issued to the date the hold-
ers of the refunded debt receive the principal payment, rather
than immediately."' 31 GAAP, on the other hand, recognizes
costs relating to an advance-refunding transaction in the year of
the transaction.32
Guernsey Memorial Hospital challenged the application of
the Secretary's policy to its 1985 advance-refunding transac-
tion.33 The hospital argued that the Secretary was required to
follow GAAP because the Secretary had not adopted a regula-
tion providing for a different treatment of these transaction
costs. In the hospital's view, PRM § 233 was insufficient to
overcome the requirements of 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20 and 413.24
to apply manual provision that required return on equity to be paid in the year after it
was incurred; finding no regulation on point, the court applied GAAP to allow cur-
rent year reimbursement).
29. An "advance-refunding transaction" occurs when a hospital borrows money to
pay off old debt prior to its maturity date. Proceeds from the new debt are deposited
into an irrevocable trusteed escrow account and invested in United States government
securities for the sole purpose of discharging the provider from any liability relating to
the old debt. Although providers usually undertake advance refundings to benefit
from lower interest rates, there are other purposes for advance refunding, such as
obtaining release from restrictive covenants or improving cash flow and increasing
borrowing capacity.
Advance-refunding transactions can result in either a gain or a loss. For example, if
the new debt (refunding debt) has a lower interest rate than the old debt (refunded
debt), the provider must borrow more principal on the new debt to generate sufficient
investment income to satisfy the debt service obligations of the old debt. Under
GAAP, the increase in principal is treated as a loss in the year of the transaction. On
the other hand, if the new debt has a higher interest rate than the old debt, the pro-
vider can borrow less principal and still generate sufficient investment income to sat-
isfy the debt service obligations of the old debt. Under GAAP, the decrease in
principal is treated as a gain in the year of the transaction.
30. See PRM, supra note 13, at § 233 (1991).
31. Id.
32. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 26 (1972).
33. Guernsey Memorial Hosp. v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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for a hospital to use accrual accounting. The Secretary re-
sponded that although 42 C.F.R. § 413.20 requires providers to
report their costs in accordance with GAAP, it does not require
the Secretary to reimburse all costs in the year that they are
reported.34 The Secretary then argued that GAAP treatment of
an advance-refunding transaction would be inconsistent with the
economic reality of the costs and would violate a statutory pro-
hibition against cross-subsidization.35
The district court applied the Chevron standard36 and upheld
the Secretary's policy finding that it was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. The district court's decision was based on its finding
that 42 C.F.R. 88 413.20 and 413.24 require application of
GAAP only for reporting purposes and not for purposes of de-
termining Medicare reimbursement. Thus, the Secretary was
free to address the advance-refunding policy in the form of a
manual provision because there was no regulation limiting her
authority.37
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20
and 413.24 require application of GAAP. The court determined
that were it not for PRM § 233, "any fair-minded person reading
the regulation in light of [GAAP] would have to conclude that
Guernsey Hospital was entitled to reimbursement" under
GAAP.38 The court found PRM § 233 to be an invalid substan-
tive rule because it conflicted with established regulations and
was not adopted in accordance with the notice and comment re-
quirements of the APA. However, the court noted that the Sec-
34. Id. at 289.
35. When adopting reasonable cost regulations, Congress requires the Secretary
to assure that costs for Medicare patients "will not be borne by individuals not so
covered, and the costs with respect to individuals not so covered will not be borne" by
other insurance programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(a)(i). In its petition for certiorari,
the government asserted that by reimbursing all costs in one year, the costs would be
inappropriately attributed to patients who will only be gaining part of the benefit of
the transaction, thereby causing Medicare to bear costs for non-Medicare patients in
the year of the advance-refunding transaction. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.5 and 9. The
government further argued that the economic reality is that the savings (or loss) from
an advance-refunding transaction relate to costs over a period of years. Guernsey,
No. 93-1251, petition for cert., at 20-21 (filed Feb. 1, 1994) (available in Westlaw, at
1994 WL 198819).
36. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
37. Guernsey, 796 F. Supp. at 290-91.
38. Guernsey Memorial Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d
830, 834 (6th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 3
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retary's "policy was not irrational and could have been
promulgated as a valid regulation. '39
The United States then petitioned the Supreme Court to re-
view the decision of the Sixth Circuit. On April 4, 1994, the
Supreme Court granted the government's petition.4° The two
questions presented are 1) whether the Secretary's regulations
require the use of GAAP and 2) if GAAP is not required,
whether PRM § 233 is an invalid substantive rule.4'
V. OTHER RECENT GAAP CASES
As a general matter, providers have not been successful in ex-
tending GAAP to other reimbursement areas recently, except in
the area of capital leases. In Ornda Healthcorp v. Shalala,42
plaintiff management company, which operated a hospital under
a capital lease, relied on GAAP to claim capital costs (deprecia-
tion and interest) as "leasehold costs" in excess of its lease pay-
ment amount. The Secretary denied payment on the amount
exceeding lease payment in accordance with 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.130(b), which precludes payment of capital costs unless
the lease qualifies as a "virtual purchase" under the regulations,
a standard that is more restrictive than the GAAP capital lease
standard. The court rejected the Secretary's interpretation,
holding that 42 C.F.R. § 413.130(b) does not address the issue of
leasehold costs. It held that in the absence of a regulation ex-
plicitly on point, GAAP must be applied, citing Guernsey with
approval.43
Two other capital lease cases contradict the Ornda decision.
First, in Methodist Hospital of Lexington, Inc. v. Sullivan," the
court found that the Secretary was justified in refusing to treat a
capital lease under GAAP as a virtual purchase pursuant to
Medicare regulations. According to the court, GAAP applies
only if there are no program guidelines; it "cannot be used to
39. Id. at 834-35. For a brief summary of case law regarding the reimbursement of
a loss on defeasance, see Methodist-Evangelical Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) 42,017, at 38,788-89 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1993) (noting that out
of one circuit court and at least five district courts considering the issue, only one
district court has sustained the Secretary's ruling on amortization). Since the Method-
ist opinion, the Fifth Circuit reversed the one district court sustaining the Secretary.
Mother Frances Hosp. v. Shalala, 15 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. 62 U.S.L.W. 3653 (Apr. 5, 1994).
41. Id.
42. Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 41,975 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 5, 1993).
43. Id. at 38,533.
44. No. 91-2684-HB (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 1992).
1994]
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override basic program requirements."45 In Pickens County
Hospital Association v. Sullivan,46 the court upheld the Secre-
tary's finding that a long-term capital lease did not constitute a
disposal on sale entitling the provider to claim a loss on disposal
under a regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 413.134(a). Because the Secre-
tary's action was found to have been based on a regulation, the
court refused to consider plaintiff's argument that the transac-
tion was a sale under GAAP.47
While it may be too early to tell whether the Ornda case is an
aberration or an indication of things to come, one thing is
clear-providers in Medicare reimbursement disputes are now
regularly asking courts to consider GAAP.
CONCLUSION
The government has made two major efforts to address the
tension between Medicare and GAAP. First, on October 9,
1991, the Secretary issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking en-
titled Clarification of Medicare's Accrual Basis of Accounting
Policy.4 8 The purpose of this proposed rule is to codify some
situations where Medicare policy departs from GAAP. These
situations include vacation pay, short-term liabilities, FICA
taxes, sick pay, and deferred compensation costs. Given the de-
cisions in Guernsey and Mother Frances,a9 the situations
presented in the proposed rule are potentially unenforceable in
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits until promulgated. However, there
are other situations where Medicare policy conflicts with GAAP
that are not addressed in the proposed regulation, such as ad-
vance refunding and capital lease costs.
Second, the government sought and was granted Supreme
Court review of Guernsey. In its petition, the Secretary ac-
knowledged that "[tjhere is not yet a conflict among the courts
of appeals regarding application of GAAP in the precise context
of advance refunding transactions . "...-50 However, the Secre-
tary's petition makes the point that a split among the circuits
does exist with regard to the application of the Secretary's gen-
eral Medicare reimbursement regulations, 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20
45. Id at 11.
46. Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) T 41,598 (N.D. Ala. June 22, 1993).
47. Id. at 36,702-03.
48. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,834 (1991).
49. 15 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 1994); see supra note 39.
50. Guernsey, petition for cert., at 14 n.9.
[Vol. 3
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and 413.24, and the use of GAAP to determine allowable
costs.5 1 The Supreme Court has said that it will address the
question of whether "general Medicare record-keeping and re-
porting regulations require that provider costs be reimbursed
according to 'generally accepted accounting principles,' despite
contrary administrative rules issued by the secretary of health
and human services ....52 We should be given the answer in
about one year.
51. Id. at 11 (citing a split between the decisions of the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits and the decisions of the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits, as well as the
Court of Claims).
52. 62 U.S.L.W. 3653.
1994]
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